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Abstract
We measure firm-level productivity changes in the Indian electricity sector dur-
ing a period that witnessed several pro-market regulatory changes. Using infor-
mation collected from multiple sources we construct a unique panel of generat-
ing firms and transmission and distribution utilities spanning the years 2000 to
2009. We employ a recently developed improvement in the Stochastic Frontier
panel method that allows controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
Using the method we jointly estimate inefficiency and exogenous determinants of
inefficiency. We estimate a flexible translog production model and compute de-
composition of productivity into components of changes in technology, efficiency,
scale and price effect. During this period, especially post Electricity Act 2003, we
observed a general decline in firm-level productivity at the mean rate of −1.6% per
year. A positive and large technical change is observed in the sector at the rate of
8% per year, attributable possibly to newer capacity addition. Except for smaller
gas based generators, inefficiency is observed to be increasing at the mean rate of
3.1% per year in the sector. Consistent with extant findings we also document no
significant impact of un-bundling on firm-level efficiency.
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1 Introduction
In the past two decades the Indian power sector has witnessed structural reforms through
several landmark regulatory changes. Along the lines of power sector reforms elsewhere
internationally, primarily reforms in India also emphasized un-bundling of vertically in-
tegrated utilities into functionally separate entities dealing with generation (production)
and transmission and distribution (T&D) (service). The reforms also attempted to at-
tract private capital to the sector. The primary policy objectives of initiating reforms
in the sector were anticipated efficiency gains and cost reduction. Therefore, an empir-
ical assessment of firm-level productivity changes in the generators and T&D utilities
shall reveal the extent to which reforms have influenced the sector in the intended direc-
tion. However, pan-India measurement of productivity changes across the power sector
value-chain poses two key challenges. First, firm-level heterogeneity due to diversity in
geography, local regulations,technology employed and other unobserved factors makes
pan-sector (and pan-India) measurements prone to omission-bias. Second, due to rel-
atively lax regulatory requirements of central collection and maintenance of firm-level
operating data in India, productivity measurements have to rely on data collated from
multiple sources or estimated from aggregate numbers. Hence, a majority of extant re-
search investigating efficiency changes in firms in the Indian power sector have have been
confined in scope to specific geography, firm or technology.
In this context we attempt to estimate pan-India firm-level productivity changes in
the generating firms, T&D utilities and a few remaining vertically integrated utilities.
Our empirical strategy to measure pan-sector efficiency change is to structurally control
for firm-level heterogeneity.1 Causal inference is crucial specifically in studies attempting
to attribute observed efficiency differences to explanatory factors. For instance, investi-
gating the influence of un-bundling on the performance of Indian power sector, Cropper
et al. (2011) employ the difference-in-difference econometric technique. The method ad-
justs for omitted variable bias caused due to unobserved variables aggregated at the state
and time period level. Therefore by design, the method provides the regression coeffi-
1After controlling for firm-level fixed effects, two important endogeneity issues still remain unresolved.
First, the problem of simultaneity, that relates to the fact that managers may adjust the firms’ output in
accordance to the observed efficiency of inputs. Second, the problem of selection bias, that results from
the fact that negative productivity shocks may drive firms to exit and due to absence of information
on non-existent firms the observations only represents a truncated distribution. These issues are not
unique to our research setting, as Fabrizio et al. (2007) points out, studies of the electricity industry
have typically not treated both these issues. However in our setting, firms are predominantly government
owned and are not forced to exit due to low profitability. In addition, electricity production in India has
remained in short supply historically, therefore the opportunity to cut back on output due to inefficiency
of inputs hardly exists. Hence, unobserved heterogeneity remains the larger econometric issue that we
proceed to address in our empirical work.
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cients on explanatory variables close to causal interpretation. In our setting to enable
causal inference in panel SFA models that jointly estimates inefficiency and the exogenous
determinants of inefficiency, (models following Battese and Coelli, 1995), it is critical to
control for unobserved heterogeneity. In a recent comparative investigation of methods,
Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento (2011) measures inefficiencies in the Finnish electric-
ity distribution utilities using five different SFA models. The study reports that models
accounting for unobserved heterogeneity produce lower inefficiency measures and consid-
erably different inefficiency rank orders. Thus, ignoring unobserved heterogeneity could
result in confounded regression coefficients with severely limited causal interpretation.
Greene (2005a,b) suggests two new methods for controlling unobserved heterogene-
ity in panel SFA models: the “true fixed-effects” model and the “true random-effects”
model. The problem of identification2 is addressed in these newer models by structurally
constraining the positive inefficiency term to be time-varying and the unobserved het-
erogeneity to be time-invariant. However, Wang and Ho (2010) points out that the ‘true
fixed-effects” SFA model suffers from the problem of incidental parameters (Neyman and
Scott, 1948; Lancaster, 2000) that might contaminate estimates of other model parame-
ters when simultaneous estimation of fixed effects and the inefficiency variance parameter
is attempted. Wang and Ho (2010) suggests a solution to this problem by developing a
model that enables elimination of unobserved fixed-effect variables (either by within or
difference transformation) prior to estimation of inefficiency.
In our study of the Indian power sector during the reforms period, we therefore employ
the Wang and Ho (2010) transformed SFA model to disentangle unobserved firm-level
heterogeneity from technical inefficiency. We empirically investigate the nature of pro-
ductivity changes in 98 firms operating in the Indian power sector during the period of
2000-2009. Our sample represents 51 generators , 38 transmission & distribution firms
and 9 vertically integrated utilities with a total of 542 firm-year observations. The un-
balanced panel of sample contains observations of firms that are under the ownership of
central government, state government and private investors. Our sample is fairly represen-
tative and accounts for 45.7% of total electricity generated and 59.4% of total electricity
consumed in India during the period of 1999-2009. Using a flexible translog produc-
tion specification we decompose the measure of productivity change into components of
changes in technology, efficiency, scale and price effects. Based on the firm-level sample
we estimate that post Electricity Act 2003 there had been no improvements in firm level
2A well known problem with conventional fixed effects SFA models with the assumption of time-invariant
inefficiency is that its not possible to distinguish inefficiency from unobserved heterogeneity captured by
the fixed effect term (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984).
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productivity. In addition, bulk of the productivity change is attributable to technology
change (newer capacity addition), wereas efficiency is observed to be generally declining.
Further, we also show that reforms had a varying degree of influence on different entities
contingent on its role in the value-chain, technology employed and ownership.
2 Deregulation and Measuring Firm Level Productivity Change
The global wave of restructuring since the early 1990’s, systematically brought about
significant changes in industry structure, ownership pattern and mode of regulation in
the electricity sector in several countries. A common feature in many of these reforms
initiatives is the dismantling of vertically integrated utilities, thus separating generation
of electricity (production) from T&D (service), such that coordination of demand-supply,
post restructuring, happens over a specialized market based mechanism. It is suggested
that the introduction of competition and market-based transactions in the sector is made
on ex-ante anticipation of improvement in technical efficiency, reduction in operating
costs and hence positive welfare gains (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983). Wolfram (2005)
argues that restructuring would lead to efficiency gains because of: (a) the new incentives
faced by the incumbents to improve efficiencies, (b) takeover of inefficient older plants and
the arrival of new entrants with newer technologies, and (c) competition driving efficient
allocation of factors of production. Thus, in the restructured industry setting, ex-post
measurement of efficiency improvements for firms across the electricity value-chain pro-
vides a basis for critical empirical scrutiny of the reforms policy3.
In this context, several extant studies investigate the influence of restructuring on
firm-level productivity changes in the electricity sector. Among alternative methods, the
non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a popular technique employed for
the measurement of efficiency in the power sector, e.g. Vaninsky (2006)4. However, with
access to panel data, the SFA method presents a natural way to incorporate informa-
tion obtained from multiple observations of the production unit spread over time. And
among other things, it also allows for a richer production specification and formal statisti-
3Fabrizio et al. (2007), employing plant level data on generators in U.S., use the difference-in-difference
method to find that introduction of market-based industry structure has led to modest medium-run cost
efficiency gains. Similarly Newbery and Pollitt (1997), find that restructuring the U.K power sector
led to gains in cost efficiency and reduction in emissions. An exhaustive survey of empirical studies
on electricity sector reforms in the developing countries by Jamasb et al. (2005) finds that institutional
development in the country and governance of the sector are key to success or failure of the reforms
initiative. Similarly, in a cross country study spanning 36 developing countries, Zhang et al. (2008) finds
that introduction of competition has relatively more significant impact than privatization in stimulating
efficiency improvements
4A survey of DEA applications in energy and environmental studies can be found in reviews by Jamasb
and Pollitt (2000) and Zhou et al. (2008).
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cal testing of hypotheses (Hjalmarsson et al., 1996). SFA is used by Knittel (2002), using
a Cobb-Douglas specification, and by Hiebert (2002), using the more flexible translog
specification for measuring efficiency of U.S. power generators. Knittel (2002) partly
controls for firm-level fixed effects by incorporating plant vintage information in the SFA
model. The study checks for influence of alternative regulatory schemes on inefficiency
and finds that performance incentive based regulation is associated with improvement in
plant-level efficiency. The SFA model used by Hiebert (2002), follows Battese and Coelli
(1995) to jointly measure inefficiency and the influence of firm-level factors associated
with the observed heterogeneity in measured inefficiency. The study identifies capacity
utilization and ownership as factors influencing efficiency, overall mixed results on effi-
ciency gains are seen across the restructured U.S. states.
The literature examining productive efficiency of the Indian electricity sector during
the reforms phase is also growing. Scholars have used broadly three class of methods in
their empirical work: the non-parametric DEA, parametric SFA, and other econometric
specifications with a dependent plant-level efficiency variable (like plant load factor, or
thermal efficiency). The DEA technique had been used to measure relative efficiencies by:
Shrivastava et al. (2012) for thermal plants during 2008-2009, Yadav et al. (2010, 2011)
for divisions of distribution utility in the north Indian state of Uttarakhand, Thakur
et al. (2006) for state owned utilities during the period 2001-2002, Chitkara (1999) for
thermal plants operated by NTPC,5 and Singh (1991) for state owned coal fired plants
during 1986-1987. The parametric SFA method had been used by: Shanmugam and
Kulshreshtha (2005) for 56 coal based plants for the period 1994-2001 (using a panel
data specification), and by Khanna et al. (1999) for 66 thermal plants during 1987-1990.
Econometric specifications with plant-level efficiency as dependent variable had been used
by: Khanna and Zilberman (1999) on 63 coal based plants during 1987-1990 to check for
regulatory and technology factors as determinants of efficiency, Cropper et al. (2011) fol-
lows the difference-in-difference method on a sample of 82 thermal power plants during
1994-2008, and Sen and Jamasb (2010) use dynamic panel-data estimator with a sam-
ple of 19 states for 1991-2007. The later two studies specifically investigate the causal
influence of restructuring on efficiency changes at the aggregate state (Sen and Jamasb,
2010), and plant (Cropper et al., 2011) level. The research on the impact of restructuring
reveals mixed outcomes. Sen and Jamasb (2010) points out that there are substantial
state-level differences in improvements attributable to heterogeneity in historic as well as
political context. (Cropper et al., 2011) finds that while un-bundling has not resulted in
improvements in thermal efficiency, there has been improvements in capacity utilization
5National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), with majority ownership of the central government of
India, is the single largest producer of electricity in India
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(+4.6%) and reduction in forced outages (−2.9%).
We note that the extant research has focused either at the aggregate state-level or
to level of generating plants. However, economically important decisions of investment
in capacity, technology and choice of factor allocations are made at the level of the firm
that operates several productive assets under its ownership and control. Especially post
un-bundling of generation from distribution and transmission, the role of the firm as the
decision making entity is more salient. Hence, in our empirical work we focus on the firm
as the unit of analysis to measure dynamic changes in efficiency at the firm-level. We also
trace the extent to which the changes are driven by factors such as ownership differences,
vintage of assets, un-bundling status of the state in which the firm is operating and
competition.
3 Indian Power Sector Reforms
The Indian Electricity Act 1910, promulgated primarily to ensure safety, was the earliest
legislative attempt to regulate the working of the Indian electricity industry. Post inde-
pendence, the Indian Constitution accorded concurrent status to the electricity sector,
thus placing it simultaneously under the responsibility of the central and state govern-
ments. Subsequently the Electricity (Supply) Act 1948 came into effect that paved the
way for the formation of vertically integrated government owned agencies: the State Elec-
tricity Boards (SEBs), entrusted with the responsibility of generation, transmission and
distribution of electricity in the respective states. However, the power sector continued
to be characterized by capacity underutilization, inefficient operations and financially
imprudent pricing policies. This consequently lead to chronic shortages, poor quality of
supply, frequent breakdowns and bankruptcy of the SEBs (World bank reference here).
The genesis of reforms in the power sector can be broadly traced to these deteriorating
conditions. Arun and Nixson (1998) presents a detailed discussion on the nature and
genesis of reforms, beginning the amendments to the Electricity Act 1910 and Supply
Act 1948 in the year 1991, which primarily opened up the sector to private investments.
Subsequently in 1998 the electricity Regulatory Commissions Act was enacted resulting
in the setting up of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) and other
state level regulatory bodies. While primarily CERC was concerned with the regulation
of firms owned and operated by the central government, it also regulated coordination ac-
tivities for entities spanning multiple states. However these early attempts hardly made
any substantial impact on the growth and recovery of the power sector. In a critical
examination of this early phase of reforms D’Sa et al. (1999), and Dubash and Rajan
(2001) highlight that the piecemeal approach to reforms failed to rein in the progressively
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languishing state of the power industry.
In contrast to these earlier fragmented reform attempts, a paradigm shift in the power
sector reform process was brought about by the legislation of the Electricity Act 2003
(GOI, 2003) on 10th July 2003. The Electricity Act 2003 replaced and consolidated
the existing legislations aiming for substantial structural changes in the Indian electric-
ity industry. The salient features of the Act included de-licensing of thermal and captive
generation, de-licensing of distribution in rural areas, open access to transmission, phased
open access to distribution, multiple licenses in distribution and recognition of electric-
ity trading as a distinct activity enabling the creation of electricity markets. A detailed
exposition of the implications of Electricity Act 2003 for generation, transmission, dis-
tribution and electricity trading can be found in Bhattacharyya (2005); Ranganathan
(2004); Singh (2006) and Thakur et al. (2005), while several limitations of the Act are
discussed in Sankar (2004).
While the reforms started in the early 1990s, structurally significant changes where
set in motion only after the enactment of the Electricity Act 2003, especially in terms
of potential to influence the technological efficiency of firms operating in the electricity
sector. The Act specifically articulates intention to instill competition in the industry and
outlines the framework to transit from vertically integrated monopoly structure to a multi-
buyer and multi-seller model. With the establishment of wholesale electricity market6,
the institutional framework for a competitive industry structure got further augmented.
Similar to observations by Ranganathan (2004) and Singh (2010) we also expect that the
series of structural changes in the electricity sector, especially during the decade starting
year 2000, demonstrates potential to incentivize firms to improve technological as well
as operational efficiency. In addition, given wide variation in ownership structure, local
regulation and historical context, we anticipate substantial pan India heterogeneity in
firm-level productivity outcome, in response to these institutional incentives. It is in this
overarching insitutional context that we empirically investigate a substantial duration of
the reform period (2000-2009), attempting to measure the extent of overall productivity
improvement in the sector and identify exogenous observable factors responsible for firm-
level heterogeneity in outcomes.
6The first Indian power exchange, Indian Energy Exchange Limited (IEXL), became operational in June
2008 and Subsequently Power Exchange India Limited (PXIL) came into existence in October 2008.
These markets are in a nascent stage of development with low transactions volumes. At present the two
exchanges together trade close to only 2% of the total power generated in the country. The functioning
of these wholesale power markets is explored in a few recent studies (Shukla and Thampy, 2011; Siddiqui
et al., 2012).
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4 Data and Method
4.1 Data
We create a sample dataset of Indian power generators and T&D utilities for the period
of 2000-2009. The sample represents about 46% of total generation and about 60%
of total electricity consumption in India during the period. The sample spans across 19
states and represents ownership under central Government, state Government and private
investors. We collect from multiple sources data on total electricity generated/distributed
and the factors of production, aggregated at the firm level. Variable definition, unit
of measurement and respective sources of data is summarized in table 1 & 2. Power
generating firms are classified as “coal-based”, “gas-based” or “mixed” depending on
the type of fuel consumed most. Firms with generating assets using coal, gas and other
sources with no one dominant fuel type is classified under the “mixed” category. Similarly,
firms engaged only in T&D function are classified as “distribution utilities” and firms
operating generators as well as engages in T&D are classified as “vertically integrated”.
The distribution of firms across the various categories is described in table 3. Summary
statistics for all the variables is shown in table 5 and the distribution of key input-output
variables across categories of firms is shown in table 4. The unit of fuel input is normalized
to energy equivalent GWhr units. From table 4, the ratio of electricity generated to fuel
input shows an aggregate input-output efficiency of about 28% and 26% for coal and gas
based generators respectively. Tranmission loss estimated from the distribution utilities is
about 28%. These estimates of aggregate efficiencies conforms well with other estimates
based on plant level measurements like CEA (2008).
4.2 Transformed fixed-effect stochastic frontier model
We start by representing a primal stochastic production frontier using a deterministic
kernel f(xnit, t;βn) producing a scalar output yit as
yit = f(xnit, t;βn).exp(it), (1)
for the ith producer i= 1, ..., I during time period t= 1, ...,T using inputs xn,n= 1, ...,N ,
where it represents producer specific time-varying stochastic inefficiency term. We choose
the flexible translog form, developed in Christensen et al. (1971); Christensen and Jor-
genson (1973), to express the time-varying stochastic production function in equation (1).
The translog production function is a local second-order approximation to any arbitrary
production function, and thus displays several desirable properties for empirical estima-
tion. The translog specification places no prior functional constrains on returns to scale,
elasticity of substitution between inputs and homotheticity. Christensen and Jorgenson
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(1973), discuss the aforementioned and other related properties of the translog production
function in detail. Additionally Diewert (1976) shows the translog form to be “exact” for
the Divisia index (Divisia, 1925). We shall use the Divisia index subsequently to estimate
efficiency change and productivity change over the period of study. For our sample of
unbalanced panel data on I producers over T time periods we assume that the production
function can be expressed in the following translog form
ln Eit = αi+βK ln Kit+βL ln Lit+βF ln Fit+βtt
+ 12βKK ln K
2
it+
1
2βLL ln L
2
it+
1
2βFF ln F
2
it
+βKL ln KitLit+βKF ln KitFit+βLF ln LitFit
+ 12βttt
2 +βKtt ln Kit+βLtt ln Lit+βFtt ln Fit+ it,
(2)
We define the inefficiency term it = vit− uit, were vit ∼ N(0,σ2v) is the noise compo-
nent and uit is the nonnegative stochastic technical inefficiency component. Similar to
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003), in this translog specification as well, time (t) proxies tech-
nical change in the stochastic production frontier as well as represents technical efficiency
change in the error component. Subsequently we shall impose distributional and model
specification restrictions to econometrically disentangle the two effects. We attempt to
separate the firm specific unobserved heterogeneity, like Greene (2005b), by introducing
the αi ’fixed-effect’ term 7. The consequent technical challenges in econometric estimation
of such a specification arise broadly due to, (a) the increased computational burden on
account of introduction of additional unknown parameters for estimation (one additional
parameter for each firm in the sample in case of fixed-effect model)., (b)the problem
of incidental parameters (Neyman and Scott, 1948; Lancaster, 2000) contaminates esti-
mates of other model parameters when simultaneous estimation of αi and the inefficiency
parameter is attempted (e.g. the “true fixed-effect” proposed in Greene (2005b) and
Greene (2005a)). The former of the two issues is addressed to some extent by recent
developments in computer algorithms (one such algorithm is detailed in Greene (2005a)).
However, in a sample with fixed T and where I →∞, the later problem of incidental
parameters results in inconsistent estimates of the variance-covariance matrix (Wang and
Ho, 2010). Since, the inefficiency parameters of interest are contained in the variance-
covariance matrix, we cannot afford to ignore inconsistency of estimates produced by a
7Other formulations that treat both the firm-specific heterogeneity αi as well as the the technical inef-
ficiency error component ui to be time-invariant encounter a fundamental problem of identification. In
such specifications (e.g.Pitt and Lee (1981) and Schmidt and Sickles (1984)) the time invariant term
remain inseparable in the form αi−ui. However, with a time-varying inefficiency specification uit, the
presence of within group variation in the sample enables separate analysis of unobserved heterogeneity
and inefficiency. This separability between the two effects is limited by the extend to which technical
inefficiency is time persistent. Greene (2005b) analyses these issues in greater detail.
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maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). Wang and Ho (2010) propose a transformation
for the panel stochastic frontier model that allows tractable MLE estimation of the ’true
fixed-effects’ model. We follow this approach to estimate the parameters of the stochastic
production function we specify in equation(2). Here MLE tractability is achieved by the
use of ‘scaling-property’ (Alvarez et al., 2006; Wang and Schmidt, 2002) to represent the
inefficiency component uit as a product of a positive non-stochastic time-varying function
and a stochastic time-invariant inefficiency term as
uit = hit.u∗i , (3)
hit = g(zkitδk) (4)
where u∗i ∼ N+(0,σ2u) is assumed to be non-negative half-normal and zkit represents
k = 1, ...,K exogenous and non-stochastic determinants of inefficiency. In this “com-
posed error” representation (it = vit− uit), the noise component vit is assumed to be
iid and distributed independently of uit. Further both u∗i and vit are assumed to be
independent of {xnit, zkit} for all T observations of the ith firm. The scaling property
lends several theoretically appealing properties enabling versatile model specifications for
empirical work, some of them are discussed in detail in (Alvarez et al., 2006; Wang and
Schmidt, 2002; Wang and Ho, 2010). Specifically, we adopt the ’within’ transformation of
stochastic frontier models made tractable by the scaling property. The ’within’ transfor-
mation removes the individual fixed-effect (incidental parameter) αi from the model, thus
inefficiency parameters can be estimated without contamination due to the incidental pa-
rameter problem.8 The ’within’ transformation model that we use for MLE estimation is
described in greater detail in the technical appendix (A) to this paper. Furthermore we
specify the time-varying component of the inefficiency term, hit, as
hit = exp(zkitδk), (5)
where, we investigate the influence of three different class of exogenous factors: (a) Vin-
tage, proxied by the year of incorporation of the firm. (b) Ownership dummies, identifying
a firm to central government, or state government ownership class and private ownership
is the reference class. (c) External environmental factors, primarily the time since elec-
tricity sector is unbundled in the state in which the firm has majority of operations and
extent of competitiveness enabled by institutional conditions. (d) Time trend, all other
dis-embodied factors proxied by a quadratic time specification. Then in equation(5), the
8Wang and Ho (2010) develop the ’first-difference’ and ’within’ transformation as two alternative ap-
proaches to eliminate the incidental variable. They also demonstrate that the log likelihood functions for
both are equivalent. However, since the ’first-difference’ transformation uses only (T − 1) observations
from each panel in the sample we instead prefer to adopt the ’within’ transformation method for our
empirical investigation.
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inefficiency determinant is specified as
zkitδk = time.δt+ time2.δtt+V intage.δV +Central Gov. Dummy.δCG
+Private Gov. Dummy.δSG
+Unbundled Dummy.δUdl
+Competition.δCmp,
(6)
4.3 Estimating productivity changes
Differentiating the production specification with respect to time, following Kumbhakar
and Lovell (2003), yields various components of TFP change. The rate of shift in pro-
duction frontier or technical change is given by
∆T = ∂ ln f(x,t;β)
∂t
, (7)
and the change in technical efficiency is obtained by
∆TE =−∂u
∂t
. (8)
The Divisia index of productivity change (Divisia, 1925) is defined for a scalar output as
˙TFP = d ln y
dt
− d ln X
dt
= y˙− X˙ = y˙−∑
n
(Snx˙n)
(9)
Where Sn =wnxn/
∑
nwnxn is the observed expenditure share of the input xn. Substitut-
ing for y˙ in equation(9) obtained by totally differentiating equation(1) yields with minor
algebraic manipulation the following decomposition of productivity change,
˙TFP = ∆T + ∆TE+ (Γ−1)∑
n
(γnΓ )x˙n+
∑
n
(γnΓ −Sn)x˙n, (10)
where the elasticity of output with respect of input xn is defined as γn = xn ∂f∂xn . The
returns to scale characterizing the production function is then expressed as Γ =∑n(γn).
The third term in equation (10),
Ψ = (Γ−1)∑
n
(γnΓ )x˙n, (11)
represents the contribution of scale effects due to expansion or contraction of inputs
towards total productivity change. Evidently under constant returns to scale (Γ = 1)
there is no contribution of scale effects. However, under increasing/decreasing returns
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to scale (Γ> 1/Γ< 1) input expansion positively/negatively contributes to productivity
change. The allocative efficiency (or price effect) given by
Ω =
∑
n
(γnΓ −Sn)x˙n, (12)
represents productivity changes that are resulting from factor prices being at deviance
from their respective marginal contribution to production. Thus, in case of factor prices
reflecting perfect marginal costs (γnΓ −Sn = 0) the contribution due to price effect would
be nil (Ω = 0). TFP change and its decomposition , derived in equation (10), can be
computed using the parameter estimates of the production function in equation (2) as
follows,
ˆ∆Tit = βˆt+ βˆttt, (13)
ˆ∆TEit = −uˆitd hit
dt
≈−uˆit (hit−hit−1)(t− t−1) , (14)
γˆnit = βˆn+
∑
k
βˆnk ln xit+ βˆntt, n= 1, . . . ,N, (15)
Γˆit =
∑
n
γˆnit (16)
5 Results
Our empirical investigation is guided by two key objectives. First, to know the distri-
bution and nature of productivity change in the power sector. Second, to identify the
sources of inefficiency. We attempt to fulfill these objectives by first, jointly estimating
inefficiency and the exogenous determinants of inefficiency. Then we decomposing the
estimated TFP changes into constituents of: technical change, efficiency change, scale
effects and price effects, to understand the nature of change.
For different classes of firms in the power sector, we estimate the primal production
model, equation (2), using the transformed fixed-effects SFA method. We employ the
Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) technique to fit the model with empirical data.
The estimated parameters of the model are shown in table (6) and TFP and its decompo-
sitions are shown in table (7). For all the estimated models, except ‘Mixed Generators’,
the inefficiency component, ln(σu), is significant and larger that the stochastic noise
component ln(σv). Therefore, for these models the data shows existence of stochastic
inefficiency different from noise. We observe that ∑nβn 6= 1 and βnk 6= βnt 6= 0, ∀n,k.
Therefore, the production technology does not conforms to the linearly homogeneous and
simpler Cobb-Douglas specification. This justifies our choice of the flexible translog spec-
ification and also implies that the scale component, γn, varies across firms and through
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time. We expect that the during this period TFP changed differently for the generators,
T&D and integrated utilities.
5.1 Generators: Coal & Gas
For the coal based generators only ownership is significantly causing efficiency differ-
ences. We estimate the central Government owned generators to be about 57% (=
1− e−0.835) less inefficienct than state Government or private owned ones. As expected
the assets vintage influences reduction in inefficiency for newer plants, about 0.25%
(= 1− e−0.239/(10∗(2008−1913)))reduction for assets newer by one year, however the effect
is not statistically significant.No influence of compeition, un-bundling or time trend in
inefficiency is observed. During this period the average per year TFP change observed
is 11%. We observe that in the period post Electricity Act 2003, after 2004, there had
been increase in technical change (shift in frontier),13% per year, while efficiency had
been declining at −7.5% per year. The mean returns to scale, Γ¯ = 1.15, indicates that
coal based power generation shows increasing returns to scale.
For gas based generators, increased state-level competition is reducing inefficiency.
Such that for every one index point increase in competition there is about 25% reduction
in inefficiency. Inefficiency also show a significant time-trend. The quadratic terms inidi-
cate that inefficiency is increasing till the year 2007 and there is improvement subsequently
(see figure (1)). No influence of asset vintage, un-bundling or ownership differences on
inefficiency is observed. There is an average reduction in TFP of −1.4% per year, and
the decline is mostly post year 2004. Post 2004, we observe that technical change has
reduced from 12.8% per year to 1.3%, whereas efficiency change has improved from -7.6%
to -0.1% per year. The mean returns to scale, Γ¯ = 0.56, indicates that gas based power
generation shows decreasing returns to scale.
5.2 T&D & Integrated Utilities
For the T&D utilities, assets vintage has a significant influence as seen by reduction
in inefficiency for newer plants. About 1.6% (= 1− e−1.496/(10∗(2008−1913))) inefficiency
reduction for assets newer by one year is observed. Inefficiency also show a significant
time-trend. The quadratic terms inidicate that inefficiency is increasing at a reducing
rate till the year 2008 and there is no decline subsequently (see figure (1)). No influence
of competition, un-bundling or ownership differences on inefficiency is observed. TFP
changed at a mean rate of 46% per year. Post 2004, technical change reducted from
13.8% to 8.4% per year and efficiency change marginaly worsened from −7.3% to −8.1%
per year. The mean returns to scale, Γ¯ = 20, indicates that T&D firms show increasing
13
returns to scale.
Only ownership is observed to be significantly associated with inefficiency differences
for the integrated utilities. The state Government owned utilities are observed to be
significantly inefficient compared to the private utilities. No influence of competition,
un-bundling or time-trend in inefficiency is observed. TFP is changing at a mean rate
of about −11% per year. Post 2004, technical change declined from 17.2% to −5.6%
per year, while efficiency improved from −13.2% to 3.3% per year. The mean returns to
scale, Γ¯ = 8, indicates that integrated utilities show increasing returns to scale.
6 Conclusion
Our results suggests that firm-level productivity in the Indian power sector has generally
declined during the period of 2000-2009. We document that state-level un-bundling of
the sector is not significantly associated with firm-level efficiency change. Further, effi-
ciency improvements attributable to increased competition is observed only in the case
of smaller gas based generators. During the period post Electricity Act 2003, we observe
positive technology change while simultaneously a decline in efficiency is observed for the
coal based generators. Improvement in efficiency over time is observed only for gas based
generators and integrated utilities, whereas T&D firms show a decline in both technical
change and efficiency.
Our results are consistent with earlier findings. For instance Cropper et al. (2011)
finds no statistically significant improvement in thermal efficiencies post un-bundling
while Sen and Jamasb (2010); Cropper et al. (2011) find a significant improvement in
plant-load factors (capacity utilization). We also observed a similar effect reflected in the
increase in mean scale change effect from 1.8% to 12% per year post year 2004. However,
contribution to TFP improvement from increased capcity utilization is offset partially by
the declining efficiencies.
These results are indicative of the piecemeal approach to power sector reforms in
India. The emphasis of reforms in India had been towards un-bundling of utilities and
opening up the sector to private independent power producers. However, market for
power remains under-developed, tariff reforms are not initiated and fuel remains short in
supply. These anomalies are likely to creates skewed incentives for firms. The generators
are governed by rate of return regulation and generally do not face retail competition.
Therefore de-licensing investment in generation creates incentives for private investors to
invest in large capital intensive projects. We observe this effect in the form of increased
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technical change only in the coal based generators, that is a result of increased investments
in newer and larger plants. From a policy perspective, our results point towards the need
for tariff reforms to encourage increased participation of independent power producers.
For the T&D firms controlled and low retail prices hardly makes-up for cost recovery
and creates disincentive for private investments. For the larger generators there is lack
of market incentives to reduce costs or improve efficiency, therefore strengthening the
electricity markets and introduction of retail competition are possible policy alternatives
to pursue.
A Within Transformed SFA Model
A.1 SFA Model Specification
The within transformed SFA model (Wang and Ho, 2010) used in this paper is described
here. Consider an SFA model with the following general specifications:
yit = αi+xnitβ+ it, i= 1, . . . , I, t= 1, . . . ,T, n= 1, . . . ,N (17)
it = vit+uit, (18)
vit ∼ N(0,σ2v), (19)
uit = hit . u¯i, (20)
hit = f(zkitδ), k = 1, . . . ,K (21)
u¯i ∼ N+(µ,σ2u). (22)
Here, xnit is a vector ofN production factor variables (or explanatory variables in general)
and αit represents unobserved fixed effect corresponding to the ith firm. vit ∼ N(0,σ2v)
is the noise component and u¯it is the nonnegative stochastic technical inefficiency com-
ponent. While u¯it is defined as a truncated normal distribution (Eq.22), in our model
we set µ = 0 and assume a half-normal distribution for the inefficiency component. The
vector zkit represents K exogenous variables determining inefficiency.
A.2 Transformed Specification
The within transformation is obtained by subtracting the sample mean of each panel from
every individual observation in the panel. The transformation, by de-meaning, removes
time-invariant fixed effects from the model. The model specification (Eq.17-22) post
transformation may be represented as:
y˜i∗ = αi+ x˜ni∗β+ ˜i∗, (23)
˜i∗ = v˜i∗+ u˜i∗, (24)
v˜i∗ ∼ N(0,Π), (25)
u˜i∗ = h˜i∗ . u¯i, (26)
u¯i ∼ N+(µ,σ2u). (27)
Here, we denote mean of individuals over the panel by yi∗ = (1/T )ΣTt=1yit, and the mean
differenced value by yit∗ = yit− yi∗. The full panel as a vector stack is represented as
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y˜i∗ = (yi1,yi2, . . . ,yiT )′. The variance-covariance matrix of v˜i∗ (Eqn. 25) is
Π =

σ2v(1−1/T ) σ2v(−1/T ) · · · σ2v(−1/T )
σ2v(−1/T ) σ2v(1−1/T ) · · · σ2v(−1/T )
... ... . . . ...
σ2v(−1/T ) σ2v(−1/T ) · · · σ2v(1−1/T )
 (28)
A.3 Log-Likelihood Function
For the model described above, Wang and Ho (2010) derives the marginal log-likelihood
function of the ith panel as follows,
ln Li =−12(T −1)ln(2pi)−
1
2(T −1)ln(σ
2
v)−
1
2 ˜
′
i∗Π−˜i∗+
1
2
(
µ21
σ21
− µ
2
σ2
)
+ ln
(
σ1Φ
(
µ1
σ1
))
− ln
(
σuΦ
(
µ
σu
))
,
(29)
where Π− is the generalized inverse of Π, φ the normal density function, Φ the cumulative
density function and,
µ1 =
µ/σ2u− ˜′i∗Π−h˜i∗
h˜′i∗Π−h˜i∗+ 1/σ2u
, (30)
σ21 =
1
h˜′i∗Π−h˜i∗+ 1/σ2u
, (31)
˜i∗ = y˜i∗− x˜i∗β (32)
The log likelihood function of the model L is obtained by summing the marginal likelihood
over i= 1, . . . , I
L= ΣIi=1Li (33)
A.4 Inefficiency and Fixed-Effect Estimation
The inefficiency index of observation/firm, i, during period, t, can be estimated as the
expection of uit conditional on the model residue, ˜i∗ :
E (uit|˜i∗) = hit
µ1 + φ
(
µ1
σ1
)
σ1
Φ
(
µ1
σ1
)
 (34)
The fixed-effects, αi’s, can be recovered from the estimates of parameters obtained,
αˆi = yi∗−xi∗βˆ+ µˆ2hˆi∗+ σˆ2hˆi∗
φ
(
µˆ2
σˆ2
)
Φ
(
µˆ2
σˆ2
)
,
(35)
where
µˆ2 =
µˆσˆ−2u − σˆ−2Tv
∑
t ˆithˆit
σˆ−2Tv
∑
t hˆ
2
it+ σˆ−2u
(36)
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σˆ22 =
σˆ2Tv∑
t hˆ
2
it+ σˆ2Tv σˆ−2u
(37)
A routine, in the R-statistical language, is written to estimate the maximum likelihood
function (Eq. 29). Additional routines computes inefficiency indices following Eq. 34 and
the firm fixed-effects following Eq. 35. The R-code is tested with STATA procedure and
test data obtained from Hun-Jen Wang, as described in detail in Wang and Ho (2010). In
addition Monte Carlo simulations are done to test the R-routine. The complete R-code
is available freely from the authors on request.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean S.d. Min Max N
Electricity Outputa 9,848.67 20,111.82 16.29 207,351.79 542
Capital Deployedb 38,992.40 72,951.23 160.60 668,474.20 542
Labourc 4,800.83 9,006.34 2.25 77,528.54 542
Fuel:Coald 63,731.08 141,227.98 117.04 738,319.02 131
Fuel:Gase 8,055.95 18,477.04 56.94 102,879.34 125
Electricity Inputf 11,858.73 14,095.34 0.55 89,783.45 193
Coal Priceg 1,533.57 246.48 1,227.40 1,839.40 542
Gas Priceh 5.21 0.88 4.00 6.60 542
Captial Pricei 8.68% 5.43% 0.10% 42.00% 542
Coal Gen. Pricej 2.10 0.57 0.64 3.26 131
Gas Gen. Pricek 3.05 1.51 1.14 9.41 125
Retail Electricity Pricel 2.11 0.76 0.48 4.05 193
Year of Incorporationm 1,987.15 22.35 1,913.00 2,008.00 542
Time Since Unbundledn 2.63 4.72 −9 13 542
Competition Indexp 23.49 7.45 0.00 40.00 542
Variable Definition and Units
a Electricity generated or distributed in GWhr. Computed by dividing reported revenue from
operations by yearly average regional electricity prices for each generating technology. In case
of T&D and vertically integrated companies the state-wise yearly average retail electricity prices
are used.
b Real gross fixed assets deployed in million Indian Rupees, deflated by GDP (1999=100)
c No. of employees. Computed by dividing the total reported employee expenditure by the yearly
average estimated wages in the power sector.
d GWhr equivalent of coal used. Computed by dividing the reported fuel expenditure by the yearly
average purchase price of coal obtained from a smaller sample of firms reporting this information.
An average calorific value of 4000KCal/Kg or 4648.9KWhr/metric tonne is assumed for coal.
e GWhr equivalent of gas used. Computed by dividing the reported fuel expenditure by the yearly
average purchase price of gas obtained from a smaller sample of firms reporting this information.
An average calorific value of 40 Mjoule/m3 or 11.11KWhr/m3 is assumed.
f Electricity purchased in GWhr. Computed by dividing reported expenditure on fuel by yearly
average region-wise electricity sale price of generators to distribution utilities.
g INR per metric tonne. Region-Year average purchase price of coal used in the power sector.
h INR per cubic meter. Region-Year average purchase price of natural in power sector.
i Percentage, computed as: Price of Capital = Expense of Capital/Gross Fixed Assets.
j INR per KWhr. Region-Year average sale price of electricity by Coal based generators.
k INR per KWhr. Region-Year average sale price of electricity by Gas based generators.
l State-Year average sale price of electricity by utilities.
m Year of incorporation of the firm. used as proxy for asset vintage.
n Time in years, since the home State power sector is unbundled.
p Index of competitiveness of power sector in the State.(0=low to 40=high)
24
Table 5: Variable Statistics, Mean (s.d), by Technology
Generation
Fossil Fuels Mixed Transmission & Distribution
Year Coal Gas Distribution
Utilities
Vertically
Inte-
grated
Electricity Outputa 17,970.34 2,054.39 5,898.20 8,560.41 16,219.20
(35,971.94) (3,614.19) (6,580.76) (8,459.28) (16,848.78)
Capital Deployedb 46,060.92 6,648.24 11,926.62 14,266.73 51,048.37
(74,565.80) (7,760.42) (17,180.15) (13,024.37) (53,554.72)
Labourc 5,963.04 329.26 2,233.28 4,759.15 15,047.49
(9,457.96) (963.34) (2,783.19) (5,595.16) (18,709.51)
Fuel:Coald 63,731.08
(141,227.98)
Fuel:Gase 8,055.95
(18,477.04)
Electricity Inputf 11,858.73 122,108.12
(14,095.34) (132,853.61)
(Firms:98) 21 19 11 38 9
(Firm-Years:542) 131 125 42 193 51
Variable Definition and Units
a Electricity generated or distributed in GWhr. Computed by dividing reported revenue from operations by
yearly average regional electricity prices for each generating technology. In case of T&D and vertically
integrated companies the state-wise yearly average retail electricity prices are used.
b Real gross fixed assets deployed in million Indian Rupees, deflated by GDP (1999=100)
c No. of employees. Computed by dividing the total reported employee expenditure by the yearly average
estimated wages in the power sector.
d GWhr equivalent of coal used. Computed by dividing the reported fuel expenditure by the yearly average
purchase price of coal obtained from a smaller sample of firms reporting this information. An average calorific
value of 4000KCal/Kg or 4648.9KWhr/metric tonne is assumed for coal.
e GWhr equivalent of gas used. Computed by dividing the reported fuel expenditure by the yearly average
purchase price of gas obtained from a smaller sample of firms reporting this information. An average calorific
value of 40 Mjoule/m3 or 11.11KWhr/m3 is assumed.
f Electricity purchased in GWhr. Computed by dividing reported expenditure on fuel by yearly average region-
wise electricity sale price of generators to distribution utilities.
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Table 6: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Translog Production Model Parameters
Variable Par. Coal Gas Mixed TnD Integr.
ln(K) βK -0.412 0.205 1.686† -2.138 -0.284*
(0.550) (1.052) (1.314) (3.349) (0.169)
ln(L) βL 1.550*** 0.864* 0.210 -0.070 -0.720***
(0.364) (0.399) (1.083) (0.867) (0.048)
ln(F ) βF 0.340 0.654† 1.924*** 0.767* 0.286
(0.287) (0.464) (0.520) (0.363) (0.349)
1
2 ln(K)ln(K) βKK 0.180* 0.256* 0.074 0.212 0.122†
(0.088) (0.145) (0.264) (0.340) (0.084)
1
2 ln(L)ln(L) βLL -0.113** 0.119* 0.330** -0.111 0.361**
(0.044) (0.054) (0.118) (0.134) (0.140)
1
2 ln(F )ln(F ) βFF 0.050* 0.224*** 0.436*** 0.070*** 0.022
(0.023) (0.035) (0.075) (0.013) (0.085)
1
2 ln(K)ln(L) βKL -0.062 -0.201† 0.232 0.222† -0.331*
(0.105) (0.153) (0.308) (0.165) (0.151)
1
2 ln(K)ln(F ) βKF -0.079 -0.380*** -0.658*** -0.206** 0.112
(0.065) (0.099) (0.192) (0.081) (0.177)
1
2 ln(L)ln(F ) βLF -0.049 -0.076 -0.668*** 0.062† -0.179†
(0.041) (0.095) (0.193) (0.039) (0.120)
Time βt -0.043 0.247† 0.114† 0.065 0.253*
(0.072) (0.184) (0.088) (0.221) (0.111)
1
2Time
2 βtt 0.026** -0.020* -0.003 -0.015* -0.046***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012)
ln(K)Time βKt -0.035*** 0.035 0.062* 0.038* -0.039**
(0.010) (0.030) (0.033) (0.022) (0.015)
ln(L)Time βLt 0.028*** -0.022 0.021 -0.014 0.083***
(0.007) (0.018) (0.041) (0.020) (0.013)
ln(F )Time βFt 0.009* -0.031* -0.077** -0.012* -0.023
(0.005) (0.016) (0.026) (0.006) (0.027)
Exogenous explanatory variables
Time δt -0.192 0.321† -0.944 0.924*** 0.080
(0.211) (0.219) (1.107) (0.290) (0.085)
Time2 δtt 0.018 -0.023† -1.318 -0.054** -0.007
(0.019) (0.016) (3.154) (0.018) (0.008)
Asset V intage δV -0.239 0.217 0.506 -1.496* 0.126
(0.191) (0.670) (1.102) (0.883) (0.139)
Owner : Central Govt. δCG -0.835*** – – -0.461 –
(0.076) – – (1.601) –
Owner : State Govt. δSG -0.045 0.193 -0.106*** 0.043 1.033***
(0.413) (0.753) (0.000) (0.369) (0.050)
Unbundled δUdl 0.081 0.034 -0.079 -1.803 –
(0.100) (0.090) (0.590) (1.441) –
Competition δCmp 0.025 -0.281† -0.483 -0.086 -0.045
(0.140) (0.210) (1.282) (0.121) (0.315)
Inefficiency
ln(σu) 2.585*** -0.297*** 0.174 -1.052† 0.087***
(0.013) (0.066) (0.165) (0.722) (0.010)
ln(σv) -4.422*** -3.967*** -4.980*** -4.028*** -6.420***
(0.148) (0.145) (0.258) (0.128) (0.251)
Log Likelihood 72.676 54.149 32.997 69.358 62.061
Standard errors (in parenthesis) computed using delta method.
Significance denoted by † : p < 0.1, ∗ : p < 0.05, ∗∗ : p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ : p < 0.001
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Figure 1: Power Sector Technical Efficiency Time-Trend
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Figure 2: Power Sector Technical Efficiency Distribution
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Figure 3: TFP Change in Power Sector
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Figure 4: Technical Change in Power Sector
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Figure 5: Efficiency Change in Power Sector
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Figure 6: Scale Effect on TFP Change in Power Sector
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Figure 7: Price Effect on TFP Change in Power Sector
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